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Almost all theoretical work on how to calculate the marginal deadweight loss has been done 
for linear taxes and for variations in linear budget constraints. This is quite surprising since 
most income tax systems are nonlinear, generating nonlinear budget constraints. Instead of 
developing the proper procedure to calculate the marginal deadweight loss for variations in 
nonlinear income taxes a common procedure has been to linearize the nonlinear budget 
constraint and apply methods that are correct for variations in a linear income tax. Such a 
procedure leads to incorrect results. The main purpose of this paper is to show how to 
correctly calculate the marginal deadweight loss when the income tax is nonlinear. A second 
purpose is to evaluate the bias in results that obtains when the traditional linearization 
procedure is used. We perform calculations based on the 2006 US tax system and find that the 
relative deadweight loss caused by increasing existing tax rates is large but less than half of 
Feldstein’s (1999) estimates for the 1994 tax system. 
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The study of the deadweight loss of taxation has a long tradition in economics going
back as far as Dupuit (1844). Modern type of empirical work on the deadweight loss of
taxation is heavily inﬂuenced by the important work of Harberger in the ﬁfties and sixties
(see for example Harberger (1962, 1964)). A second generation of empirical work was
inspired by Feldstein (1995, 1999). Feldstein argued that previous studies had neglected
many important margins that are distorted by taxes. By estimating how total taxable
income reacts to changes in the marginal tax, one would be able to capture distortions
of all relevant margins. Feldstein’s own estimates indicated large welfare losses whereas
many later studies arrived at estimates of the welfare loss that were larger than those
obtained in pre-Feldstein studies, but considerably lower than the estimates obtained by
Feldstein. An important ingredient in modern studies of the deadweight loss of taxes is
the estimation of a (Hicksian) taxable income supply function (Gruber and Saez, 2002;
Kopczuk, 2005; Saez, 2010; Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz, 2009). These taxable income
functions show how taxable income varies as the slope of a linear budget constraint of
individuals is changed at the margin.
Almost all theoretical work on how to calculate the marginal deadweight loss has
been done for linear taxes and hence for variations in linear budget constraints. This
is quite surprising since most income tax systems are nonlinear, generating nonlinear
budget constraints. Instead of developing the proper procedure to calculate the marginal
deadweight loss for variations in nonlinear income taxes, one has linearized the nonlinear
budget constraint and applied the procedure that is correct for variations in a linear
income tax. As we will show, this leads to incorrect results. The main purpose of
our article is to show how to correctly calculate the marginal deadweight loss when
the income tax is nonlinear. A second purpose is to evaluate the bias in results that
obtains when the traditional linearization procedure is used. For tax systems where the
marginal income tax increases with the taxable income, this linearization procedure may
often lead to an overestimate of the marginal deadweight loss.
Actual tax systems are usually piecewise linear and, in the end, we describe how to
calculate the marginal deadweight loss for such tax systems. However, in order to get
simple and clean results, we start our analysis by considering smooth budget constraints.
We then describe how results are modiﬁed when the budget constraints are piecewise
linear. It should be noted that the average, or aggregate, behavior for a population does
not depend on whether the tax system and budget constraints are kinked or smooth.
It is the general shape of the tax system and budget constraints that determine the
2average behavior.1 To simplify the analysis, we consider tax systems that generate
convex budget sets.2 Historically, much focus has been on how the income tax distorts
labor supply. Since the more recent literature has the focus on taxable income, we state
our results in terms of this concept. Of course, it is easy to modify our results to some
other application.
The layout of the rest of this article is as follows. Section 2 gives the results for a
smooth budget constraint. Section 3 derives the results for a piecewise linear budget
constraint. Section 4 presents a numerical computation for the US tax system and
Section 5 concludes.
2 Marginal Deadweight Loss when the Budget Constraint
is Smooth
A linear income tax can be varied in two ways. One can change the intercept, which leads
to a pure income eﬀect, or change the proportional tax rate, which leads to a substitution
and an income eﬀect. For a nonlinear income tax, there are many more possible ways to
vary the tax. Break points can be changed, the intercept can be changed and the slope
can also be changed. Moreover, the slope can be changed in diﬀerent ways. We do not
cover all these diﬀerent possibilities to vary a nonlinear tax. We focus on a particular
kind of change in the slope, namely a change in the slope such that the marginal tax
changes with the same number of percentage points at all income levels. Therefore, we
model the tax in the following way. Let A denote taxable income and the tax on A be
given by T (A) = g (A) + tA, with g′ (A) > 0, g′′ (A) > 0 and t ≧ 0. We can think of
g (A) as a nonlinear federal tax. There are several alternative interpretations of tA. It
could be a payroll tax, a value added tax or a proportional state income tax. Within
the Scandinavian framework, it could be interpreted as the local community tax. What
we study is the marginal deadweight loss of an increase in t. A change in t implies that
the marginal tax is increased by the same percentage point at all income levels.
There are two good reasons why we have chosen to parameterize the tax system in
the way described above. When we vary the slope of a linear budget constraint, the
1This should be qualiﬁed. A smooth tax schedule is a good approximation of a piecewise linear tax
schedule provided the distribution of the kink points is regular enough.
2This assumption is just for simplicity. The general insights of the article applies also to the case
with a concave budget set. If the curvature of the indiﬀerence curves is larger than the curvature of the
budget constraint so that an interior unique solution of the individual’s utility maximization problem
obtains, most of the formulas below apply. The analysis becomes more complex if the budget constraint
is concave and more curved than the indiﬀerence curves. One then has to take the possibility of multiple
solutions and/or corner solutions into account.
3intercept will not change. It is of value to have a parameterization of the nonlinear tax
that has a similar property. When we in the next section study the marginal deadweight
loss for a piecewise linear budget constraint, we will see that, for the parameterization
used, a change in t will not change the virtual incomes but only the slope, thereby giving
a clean experiment similar to a change in the slope of a linear budget constraint.3 A
second reason is, of course, that real tax systems are of a form as the one described by
g (A) + tA.
Consider the utility maximization problem:
max
A,C
U (C,A,v) s.t. C ≦ A − g (A) − tA + B, (P1)
where C is consumption, v an individual speciﬁc preference parameter and B lump-sum
income. We assume that the utility function U (C,A,v) has the usual properties and
that the tax system deﬁnes a convex budget set. We denote the solution to problem
(P1) as A(t,B,v),C (t,B,v). The form of these two functions depends on the functional
forms of U and g. Sticking A(t,B,v),C (t,B,v) back into the utility function, we obtain
the indirect utility u(v) := U (C (t,B,v),A(t,B,v),v). For each individual, the latter
is the maximum utility level obtained under the given tax system. Because individuals
have diﬀerent v’s, they chose diﬀerent taxable incomes and have diﬀerent u(v). To
simplify the notations, we henceforth suppress the v in u(v). However, it should be kept
in mind that the u given in expressions below vary between individuals.
We now study the marginal deadweight loss of a small increase in t. We ﬁrst derive
the correct expression and then describe how it usually is calculated. For this purpose,
we deﬁne the expenditure function as:
E (t,v,u) = min
A,C
{C − A + g (A) + tA − B} s.t. U (C,A,v) ≧ u. (P2)
This problem also deﬁnes the compensated supply and demand functions, Ah (t,v,u) and
Ch (t,v,u) respectively, where the superscript h denotes that it is Hicksian functions. It
is important to note that these functions depend on the functional form of U (C,A,v)
and on the functional form of g (A). In almost all empirical and theoretical analyses,
we work with demand and supply functions generated by linear budget constraints. In
contrast, the functions deﬁned by (P1) and (P2) are generated by a nonlinear budget
constraint.
3This nice feature of the parameterization used was pointed out to us by H˚ akan Selin.
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where we used the envelope theorem to obtain dE (t,v,u)/dt = Ah. Expression (2) is
the correct expression for the marginal deadweight loss.
We next describe a commonly used procedure that, in general, overestimates the
marginal deadweight loss. Let us consider particular values v∗, t∗ and B∗ and the solution
to (P1), A∗ = A(t∗,v∗,B∗),C∗ = C (t∗,v∗,B∗). We can linearize the budget constraint
around this point with local prices deﬁned by pc = 1 and pA = g′ (A∗)+t∗ to obtain the




U (C,A,v∗) s.t. C ≦ A − pAA + M. (P3)
We call AL (pA,v∗,M),CL (pA,v∗,M) the solution to this problem. Here, we use the
subscript L to show that these are functions generated by a linear budget constraint.
We deﬁne the expenditure function corresponding to this linear budget constraint as
EL (t,v,u) = min
A,C
{C − A + pAA − M} s.t. U (C,A,v) ≧ u (P4)
and denote its solution by Ah
L (t,v,u),Ch
L (t,v,u), where the subscript L indicates that
it is the solution to a problem where the objective function is linear and the superscript

















































5Figure 1: Nonlinear and Linearized Programmes
Figure 1 illustrates the four optimization problems that we have studied. The opti-
mization problem (P1) maximizes utility given the curved budget constraint in the ﬁgure.
Let us consider particular values for the proportional tax and lump-sum income: t∗ and
B∗. Suppressing the dependence on v, we denote the solution by A∗ = A(t∗,B∗),C∗ =
C (t∗,B∗). This deﬁnes the utility level u∗ = U (C∗,A∗). Optimization problem (P2)
minimizes expenditures to reach the utility level u∗ for the given nonlinear tax system.
By construction, the solution to this problem is also A∗,C∗. Linearizing around (A∗,C∗),
so that the linear budget constraint is tangent to the indiﬀerence curve at (A∗,C∗), we
have two other optimization problems. Problem (P3) maximizes utility subject to the
linear budget constraint going through (A∗,C∗) and having the same slope as the in-
diﬀerence curve through (A∗,C∗). Problem (P4) is to minimize expenditures given the
utility level u∗ and the general shape of the budget constraint given by the linear budget
constraint. By construction, the four optimization problems have the same solution. For
any t and B, we have the identities
A(t,B) ≡ Ah (U (C (t,B),A(t,B)))
≡ AL (pA (C (t,B),A(t,B)),M (C (t,B),A(t,B))) ≡ Ah
L (U (C (t,B),A(t,B))). (4)
Expressions (2) and (3) look quite similar. By construction, it is true that Ah
L = Ah,




+ t = g′ ￿
Ah￿
+ t. However, dAh/dt and dAh
L/dt diﬀer. To show
this, we start with a simple example, which we then generalize.
2.1 Simple Example
To simplify notation, we in this example suppress the preference parameter v. Assume
the utility function takes the quasilinear form U = C −αA−βA2. This implies that the
income eﬀect for the supply of A is zero, so that the Marshallian and Hicksian supply
functions are the same. We assume that the tax is given by T (A) = tA+pA+πA2, where
we can interpret tA as a state tax and pAA+πA2 as the federal tax. This yields a budget
constraint C = A−(p + t)A−πA2 +B, where B is lump-sum income. Substituting the
budget constraint into the utility function, we obtain U = A − (p + t)A − πA2 + B −
αA−βA2. Maximizing with respect to A, we get dU/dA = 1−(p + t)−2πA−α−2βA.
We see that a necessary condition for a non-negative A is 1 − (p + t) − α ≧ 0. We ﬁnd
that d2U/dA2 = −2(π + β) < 0 for π+β > 0. Setting dU/dA = 0 and solving for A, we
obtain
A =
1 − (p + t) − α
2(π + β)
. (5)








From (6), we see that the size of the substitution eﬀect depends on the curvatures of the
indiﬀerence curve and the budget constraint. We note that it is immaterial whether the
curvature emanates from the indiﬀerence curve or from the budget constraint. What
matters is the curvature of the indiﬀerence curve in relation to the budget constraint.
The larger the total curvature, given by 2(π + β) in our example, the smaller is the
deadweight loss.
Suppose that we have particular values for the parameters of the problem and
denote the solution {C∗,A∗}. We can linearize the budget constraint around this
point and get the budget constraint C = A − [(p + t) + 2πA∗]A + M, where M =





C − αA − βA2￿
s.t. C ≦ A − [(p + t) + 2πA∗]A + M. (7)
Substituting the binding budget constraint into the utility function, we want to maximise
7A − [(p + t) + 2πA∗]A + M − αA − βA2. Denoting this expression by e U, we obtain
de U/dA = 1 − (p + t) − 2πA∗ − α − 2βA and d2e U/dA2 = −2β. The second-order
condition is satisﬁed for β > 0. Setting de U/dA = 0 and solving for A, we get Ah
L =








Suppose π = β = 0.1. We then have that dAh/dt = −2.5 while using the supply function
generated by the linearized budget constraint gives dAh
L/dt = −5. This means that the
linearization procedure overestimates the deadweight loss with a factor 2.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the deadweight loss of a discrete change in t, from t = 0
to t = 0.3, for parameter values of α = β = 0.1, p = 0.2, π = 0.05 and B = 1. In the
left panel, we show the correct calculation of the deadweight loss using a variation in
the nonlinear budget constraint. The bundle chosen prior to the tax change is A, at
the tangency point between the budget constraint and the highest feasible indiﬀerence
curve. The increase in t shifts the nonlinear budget constraint in such a way that A′
is now chosen instead of A. The deadweight loss corresponds to the diﬀerence between
the equivalent variation and the variation in tax revenue. It is thus shown by the thick
vertical line below A′. In the right panel, we show the standard procedure which employs
a variation in the linearized budget constraint. The nonlinear budget constraint through
A is linearized around this point. The increase in t induces a rotation of the linearized
budget constraint around the intercept. The bundle AL is now chosen instead of A. We
see that the deadweight loss, shown by the thick vertical line below AL, is much larger
than when the correct procedure is used.
2.2 General Utility Function
We can easily generalize the above. Let us consider the general utility function U (C,A,v).
The Hicksian supply function for taxable income is deﬁned by problem (P2). We will
reformulate this problem. The constraint U (C,A,v) ≧ u is binding at the optimum
and can thus be rewritten as C = f (A,v,u), where the function f is deﬁned by
U (f (A,v,u),A,v) = u. Substituting the constraint C = f (A,v,u) into the objec-
tive function, we obtain the minimization problem minA f (A,v,u)−A+tA+g (A)−B.
Let us for convenience use the notation f′ () to denote ∂f/∂A. The ﬁrst order condi-
tion f′ (A,v,u) − 1 + t + g′ (A) = 0 deﬁnes the Hicksian supply function Ah (t,v,u).
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Figure 2: Deadweight loss when the budget constraint is nonlinear (left panel) and
linearized (right panel)





g′′ + f′′. (9)
In the analysis above f′ (A,v,u) is the slope of the indiﬀerence curve and f′′ (A,v,u)
shows how the slope of the indiﬀerence curve changes as A is increased along the indif-
ference curve. Hence, it gives the curvature of the indiﬀerence curve. For the special
case of a quasilinear utility function, with zero income eﬀects for the taxable income
function, u would not be an argument in the f () function.
We have seen that the curvature of the budget constraint is as important for the
size of the marginal deadweight loss as is the curvature of the indiﬀerence curve. What
matters is the curvature of the indiﬀerence curve in relation to the budget constraint.
From (9), we see that dAh/dt reduces to dAh/dt = −1/f′′ if the budget constraint is








In empirical studies of the taxable income function, it is the taxable income function
Ah
L (t,v,u), valid for a linear budget constraint, that is estimated and reported. However,
if we know dAh
L/dt as well as the tax function T (A) = g (A)+tA, it is easy to calculate
the comparative statics for the taxable income function Ah (t,v,u). This is because the











2.3 Marginal Deadweight Loss for the Population
From a welfare point of view, there is no obvious way how one should aggregate the
marginal deadweight loss for diﬀerent individuals. However, it is fairly common to
calculate the average or total marginal deadweight loss. Without loss of generality, we
choose to normalize the size of the population to 1 in the rest of the paper. Hence,
the average and total measures are the same and we will speak of ”aggregate marginal
deadweight loss” to refer to the marginal deadweight loss for the entire population.
The latter can be computed in the following way. Suppose that the distribution v in
the population is described by the continuous pdf φ(v) with support over (v,v). Using













By (3), we could give a similar expression for the marginal deadweight loss calculated
with the function Ah





￿ ￿, it is clear that
the aggregate marginal deadweight loss calculated with the function Ah
L gives a higher
value than if calculated using Ah. If some other weighting were used, we would get a
similar result. For example, we might weigh by incomes as is sometimes done in the
literature. That would of course change the numerical results but the qualitative results
would still hold.
We will not give a numerical example here but instead do this for the piecewise linear
case.
10Figure 3: Piecewise Linear Budget Constraints
3 Marginal Deadweight Loss when the Budget Constraint
is Piecewise Linear
We now consider the marginal deadweight loss when the tax system is piecewise linear.
The tax system that we consider is of the same form as above, but the federal tax is
piecewise linear. To illustrate the mechanisms at work, it is suﬃcient to consider a tax
system generating a budget constraint with two linear segments and one kink point. The
results easily generalize to a tax system with many kinks. In a numerical example below,
we consider a tax system with three linear segments and two kinks.
Let the federal tax system be characterized by the marginal tax rate τ1 for taxable
income up to the break point A1 and the marginal tax τ2 for incomes above the break
point. Let there also be a state income tax of t. The budget constraint generated by this
tax system is shown in Figure 3. The intercept for the ﬁrst segment, R1, is lump-sum
income. The slope on the ﬁrst segment is given by θ1 = 1 − τ1 − t and for the second
segment by θ2 = 1 − τ2 − t. The virtual income for the second linear segment is given
by R2 = R1 + (θ1 − θ2)A1 = R1 + (τ2 − τ1)A1. Hence, the virtual income R2 does not
depend on t and does not change if t is varied.
To make the problem interesting, we need some individuals locating in the interior
of the segments and some at the kink point. Hence, we now re-introduce the hetero-
11geneity parameter v explicitly and write the utility function U (C,A,v), where v is a
preference parameter with pdf φ(v) over (v,v). If we had a pure labor supply model, it
would be natural to write the utility function as U (C,A/v) and interpret v as the wage
rate. However, since in the taxable income literature, it is assumed that there are other
margins than hours of work, we prefer to write it in the more general form U (C,A,v).
For one interval of v, we would have solutions on the ﬁrst segment; for another interval,
at the kink point and, for a third interval, on the second segment.
A ﬁrst step is to ﬁnd out how the budget constraint changes as the tax parameter t
increases. We know that R1 and R2 do not change. The slopes of the ﬁrst and second
segments decrease. The kink point is still at A1. However, its C-coordinate decreases
by dt × A1, the amount of the extra tax paid. For a person located at the kink point
before and after the change in t, we have dAh/dt = 0. Therefore, there is no marginal
deadweight loss from the increase in t for this person. The increase in taxes paid by a
person located at the kink is just like a lump-sum tax. For a person with a tangency on
one of the linear segments, the variation in the budget constraint is just like a variation in
a linear budget constraint. For such a person, one can therefore apply the taxable income
function that is generated by a linear budget constraint and the marginal deadweight
loss for an individual with parameter v would be given by
−(τi + t)
dAh
L (τi + t,v,u)
dt
, (13)
with i = 1,2, where we should remember that u is a function of v.
If we want to ﬁnd the aggregate marginal deadweight loss, we can integrate over
v. For simplicity, we assume that v enters the utility function in such a way that
Ah
L is strictly increasing in v. We also assume that 0 < Ah
L (τ1 + t,v,u) < A1 <
Ah
L (τ2 + t,v,u): no one chooses the zero solution and there are individuals choosing
a bundle on the ﬁrst segment, some others at the kink and some others on the second
segment. Let v1 be deﬁned by Ah
L (τ1 + t,v1,u) = A1 and v2 by Ah
L (τ2 + t,v2,u) = A1
as shown in Figure 3. Deﬁne the subsets S1 = (v,v1) and S2 = (v2,v). Likewise deﬁne
the set K1 = (v1,v2). Then individuals with v ∈ S1 will have a solution on the ﬁrst
segment, individuals with v ∈ S2 on the second segment and persons with v ∈ K1 a
solution at the kink point.










12where δ generically represents the (non-marginal) deadweight loss for person v. The
aggregate marginal deadweight loss is the derivative of this expression with respect to t,




1t (t,v)φ(v)dv + v′





2t (t,v)φ(v)dv + v′
2 (t)δ2 (t,v2 (t))φ(v2 (t)) − v′





3t (t,v)φ(v)dv − v′
2 (t)δ3 (t,v2 (t))φ(v2 (t)). (15)
To compute the (non-marginal) deadweight loss for person v1 or v2, we need to consider
his taxable income and his highest feasible indiﬀerence curve. So, it is not the slope of the
budget constraint that matters here. The slope of the budget constraint matters when
evaluating his marginal deadweight loss. We thus have δ1 (t,v1 (t)) = δ2 (t,v1 (t)) and
δ2 (t,v2 (t)) = δ3 (t,v2 (t)), which implies that the terms in (15) showing movements in















To compute the aggregate marginal deadweight loss, we only integrate along the segments
of the budget sets; the contribution from individuals bunched at the kink point is zero.
The diﬀerence between the smooth case and the piecewise linear case is that, in the
former, the actual marginal deadweight loss is lower than that indicated by the “linear”
taxable income function for any v and the corresponding value of A. In the piecewise
linear case, the diﬀerence in the two measures is concentrated to the kink. If there were
several kinks, the diﬀerence would also be concentrated to the kinks.
3.1 Comparison of the Deadweight Loss for a Linear versus a Piecewise
Linear Budget Constraint
To get an idea about the numerical diﬀerence between the aggregate marginal deadweight
loss calculated according to (16) versus using a linearized budget constraint, we consider
a numerical example. We consider a functional form for the taxable income function
that often has been estimated in the taxable income literature: A = θβev, where θ is
the slope of a linear budget constraint. Depending on context, the parameter v can
be given various interpretations. Here we interpret it as the wage rate (Chetty, 2009).
The preference speciﬁcation implies that we have assumed away income eﬀects and the
13Marshallian and Hicksian supply functions are the same. It also implies that the Hicksian
supply function does not depend on u. Taking logs, it has the form lnA = β lnθ + v.
We readily obtain dAh






= (τ + t)
βA
θ
= (τ + t)βθβ−1ev. (17)
Assuming that v is uniformly distributed on [0,1], the aggregate marginal deadweight
loss for a linear budget constraint with slope θ is
DWL (θ) = (τ + t)βθβ−1
Z 1
0
evdv = βθβ−1 (τ + t)(e − 1). (18)
Let us next consider the aggregate marginal deadweight loss for a piecewise linear
budget constraint with three segments. We denote the break points A1 and A2. For sim-
plicity, we consider a budget constraint deﬁning a convex budget set. With this form for




























































. An individual has a solution on segment i if v ∈ Si
and at kink i if v ∈ Ki. The integral over S1 is
















In a similar way, the integral over S2 is











Following (16), the true marginal deadweight loss is therefore given by DWTRUE =
P
i DWSi.
Let us exemplify with some numbers. Empirical studies using the functional form
considered in our example have often found a value of β around 0.4 (Saez, Slemrod,
and Giertz, 2009). Therefore, let β = 0.4, A1 = 1, A2 = 1.4, θ1 = 0.7, θ2 = 0.5 and
θ3 = 0.3 (implying marginal tax rates of τ1 + t = 0.3, τ2 + t = 0.5 and τ3 + t = 0.7).
Given these numbers, we ﬁnd that DWTRUE = 0.398. There is no obvious way for how
14we should linearize the budget constraint and we therefore consider several alternatives.
If we linearize around the ﬁrst segment, we obtain DWL (θ1) = 0.255. If we linearize
around the second segment, we obtain DWL (θ2) = 0.521 and if we linearize around the
third DWL (θ3) = 0.991. An unweighted average of DWL (θ1), DWL (θ2) and DWL (θ3)
gives 0.589. None of these calculations, building on linearized budget constraints, is a
good approximation of the true marginal deadweight loss.
In the example above, we for simplicity assumed a uniform distribution. If we instead
had assumed a pdf with more of the density mass in the middle of the support and thinner
tails, then, if the interval with higher density were where the kinks are, the marginal
deadweight loss DWTRUE would have been lower.
Relatively little research has examined the evidence of bunching at kink points in
actual data. Using microdata from US tax returns over the period 1960-97, Saez (2010)
ﬁnds clear evidence of bunching around the ﬁrst kink of the Earned Income Tax Credit
among self-employed workers and, to a lesser extent, around the threshold of the ﬁrst
tax bracket where tax liability starts. He ﬁnds little evidence of bunching at other
tax brackets. Other studies have found modest evidence of bunching, for elderly US
workers who are both working and receiving social security beneﬁts in Burtless and
Moﬃtt (1984) and Friedberg (2000), above the ﬁrst eligibility threshold for the UK
earned income tax credit in Blundell and Hoynes (2004) or for the Australian Higher
Education Contribution Scheme in Chapman and Leigh (2009).
If few persons are found at kink points, we believe there are two possible interpre-
tations of this. One interpretation is that the compensated elasticity is small, i.e., the
indiﬀerence curves are heavily curved. Another interpretation is that many individuals
are planning to be at the kink point, but due to optimization errors are slightly oﬀ the
goal. The part played by optimization frictions has recently been emphasized by Chetty
(2009) who estimates labor supply elasticities. If the ﬁrst interpretation is correct, it
implies that marginal deadweight losses are small and that studies indicating large elas-
ticities are incorrect. If the latter interpretation is correct, it means that the number of
individuals that would be at a kink point in the long run, when they have been able to
fully adjust to the actual tax schedule, is underestimated in many studies. Whether the
low number of individuals actually found at kink points is due to optimization errors
or heavily curved indiﬀerence curves, the aggregate marginal deadweight loss should be
calculated as described above with an assumed (preferably estimated) distribution of
the preference term.
154 Numerical Application on US Tax System
This section presents estimates of the average marginal deadweight loss of the US tax
system. As in Saez (2010), we consider that individual preferences are described by a
quasilinear and isoelastic function of the form








where v can be interpreted as a wage parameter. The quasilinearity assumption implies
that there is no income eﬀect on labor supply and that the Marshallian and Hicksian
taxable income functions are equal. The isoelastic assumption implies that the elasticity
of taxable income is constant, equal to β. Given the preference speciﬁcation, a v-person
facing a linear budget constraint with slope θ has taxable income A = vθβ. As a
benchmark, we consider that β = 0.4, but we also provide simulations for β = 0.2 and
β = 1.04, the latter value being used by Feldstein (1999).
We take into account the federal income tax, the state income tax, the earned income
tax credit, the payroll tax, the state sales tax and the local sales tax. We use the
Californian tax schedule to compute the state taxes. California is the state with the
largest population and many other states have similar income tax schedules. The payroll
tax and the sales taxes are linear. The payroll tax is 15.3% and the state sales tax in
California is 7.25%. Local taxes vary. In our computations, we assume that the local
sales tax is 0.5%. Overall, the linear component of the tax system, denoted by t in
the previous sections, represents 23.05% of the taxable income. The earned income tax
credit, the federal income tax and state income tax are piecewise linear. Altogether,
they give rise to 14 tax brackets. The earned income tax credit creates a nonconvexity
of the budget constraint. This nonconvexity for incomes between $7,550 and $30,650 is
slight as shown in Figure 4 and we therefore choose to convexify the budget constraint
by taking its convex hull.
Our calculations are provided for 2006. We have used the CPS Labor Extracts,
restricted to singles without children, to obtain the distribution of individual shown in
Figure 5. In our computations, we do not smooth the distribution but use the actual
individual data. Because the distribution is truncated in the CPS Labor Extracts, with a
maximum of $150.000 per year, we have completed it with a Pareto distribution. Because
Saez (2001) has shown that US top incomes follow a Pareto distribution with parameter
2, the underlying wages distribution follows a Pareto distribution with parameter 2.
Computationally, we adapt the procedure described in Subsection 3.1 to the utility
















Figure 4: Nonlinear Budget Constraint in the US
function (22) and the distribution of wages in the US.
We study the average marginal deadweight loss of an increase in t by 2.305 percentage
points. That is t is increased by 10%. The results are shown in Table 1. They contrast
the results obtained using the correct procedure which does not rely on any linearization
with those obtained when linearizing along segments of the US tax schedule. Rather
than providing values for every possible linearization, from θ1 to θ14, we report results
for linearizations along the ﬁrst segment, the last segment and the segment along which
the median individual optimizes. It appears that the linearization procedure usually
leads to signiﬁcant errors for both the marginal deadweight loss and the marginal tax
revenue.
For β = 0.4, the tax increase described above yields an additional tax revenue of
$767.7 per capita. The deadweight loss increases by $329.1 per capita. Therefore, for
any additional collected dollar, there is an extra loss of $0.442.
Our results can be compared with those obtained by Feldstein (1999) who uses a
linearization procedure and a value of β equal to 1.04. His calculations incorporate the
income tax rates and rules as of 1994. He ﬁnds that the incremental deadweight loss
per dollar of additional revenue is about $2.06. With the procedure described above and
with the same value of β as Feldstein, we ﬁnd that the incremental deadweight loss is
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Figure 5: Distribution of Wages in 2006 in the US (from CPS Labor Extracts, for singles
without children)





















































Table 1: Marginal Deadweight Loss and Marginal Tax Revenue
185 Conclusion
Actual tax systems are usually such that the marginal tax changes with the income
level, implying that the budget constraints that individuals face are nonlinear. It is
of interest to calculate the marginal deadweight loss of changes in a nonlinear income
tax. A nonlinear income tax can be varied in many diﬀerent ways. Break points can
be changed, the intercept can be changed and the slope can be changed. Moreover, the
slope can be changed in diﬀerent ways. We do not cover all these diﬀerent possibilities
to vary a nonlinear tax. We focus on a particular kind of change in the slope, namely
a change in the slope such that the marginal tax changes with the same number of
percentage points at all income levels. Such a change can represent, for example, a
change in the pay roll tax, the value added tax or a proportional state income tax. A
common procedure to calculate the marginal deadweight loss of a change as described
above has been to linearize the budget constraint at some point and then calculate the
marginal deadweight loss for a variation in the linearized budget constraint. As shown in
the article, such a procedure does not give the correct value of the marginal deadweight
loss.
In this article, we ﬁrst derive the correct way to calculate the marginal deadweight
loss when the budget constraint is smooth and convex. It is well known that the size of
the deadweight loss depends on the curvature of the indiﬀerence curves, with more curved
indiﬀerence curves yielding smaller substitution eﬀects and lower marginal deadweight
losses. We show that the curvature of the budget constraint is equally important for
the size of the marginal deadweight loss. In fact, the curvature of the budget constraint
enters the expression for the marginal deadweight loss in exactly the same way as the
curvature of the indiﬀerence curve.
We next show how to calculate the marginal deadweight loss when the tax system
generates a piecewise linear budget constraint. It is equally true in this case as for the
case with a smooth budget constraint that the curvature of the budget constraint is of
the same importance for the marginal deadweight loss as the curvature of the indiﬀerence
curve. However, the impact of the curvature of the budget constraint to diminish the
deadweight loss is now concentrated to the kink points. For individuals located at a kink
point, there is no marginal deadweight loss, for them the increase in the marginal tax is
just like a lump-sum tax.
We also perform numerical calculations where we calculate the true marginal dead-
weight loss and compare this with computations obtained by linearizing the budget
constraint and performing the marginal deadweight calculations on the linearized bud-
19get constraint. Depending on where the linearization is performed the linearization
procedure will either under- or overpredict the true value of the marginal deadweight
loss.
It is very simple to use the correct procedure to compute the marginal deadweight
loss. Therefore, there is no need to rely on a linearization procedure which leads to an
incorrect measure.
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